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Abstract:  This paper measures how the costs of children are shared between the father and the 
mother by estimating a gender specific demand system related to the demand for 
market  goods,  household products and  leisure  within  a  collective  approach.  The 
estimates illustrate how the intra-household distribution of resources varies across 
households with and without children and how wages and non-labor income affect 
the allocation rule in both one-earner and double-earner households. In the presence 
of a child, both parents, but mothers especially, increase their involvement in home 
production at the expense of the enjoyment of leisure. This commitment decreases as 
the child gets older. In  general, mothers control less than half of the household 
resources, while they bear more than half of the cost of maintaining a child.  
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1.  Introduction  
This  paper  measures  the  costs  of  children  taking  into  account  both  consumption 
expenditures  and  time  costs  (Apps  and  Rees  2002,  2009;  Bradbury  1994,  2004a,  2004b, 
2004c, 2008; Koulovatianos et al. 2009) and determines how the full cost of a child is shared 
between the mother and the father. To do so we estimate the rule governing the allocation of 
resources  within  households  with  and  without  children  deriving  and  estimating  a  gender 
specific  complete  demand  system  consistent  with  a  collective  household  model  with 
household  production  (Apps  and  Rees  2002,  Aronsson,  Daunfeldt,  and  Wilkström  2001, 
Rapoport, Sofer, Solaz 2009, Rapoport and Sofer 2004, Bourguignon and Chiuri 2005).  
While  traditional  equivalence  scales  are  based  only  on  information  related  to  the 
consumption of market goods, in the present application we also include the consumption of 
non-market goods produced by the household and the consumption of parental time devoted 
to childcare with the aim of estimating the full cost of children. Given that the objective of the 
study is the estimation of the proportion of the full costs of children borne by each spouse it is 
improper to model the household as unitary where resources are equally distributed across 
family members (Bourguignon 1999). Following the initial work of Apps and Rees (1996), 
we model individual preferences for leisure, household products and market goods using a 
system of gender-specific demand equations. We extend their model by incorporating the 
sharing rule VXPPDUL]LQJWUDQVIHUVEHWZHHQFRXSOH¶VPHPEHUV within a structural estimation  
(Browning et al. 1994; Arias et al. 2004).  
We  exploit  the  estimated  information  about  the  intra-household  distribution  of 
resources to measure how full costs of children are distributed between mother and father,  
DQGWRGHWHUPLQHHDFKSDUHQW¶VFRQWULEXWLRQLQWHUPV of both goods and time. As in Apps and 
Rees (1996, 2002), we recognize differences in household types stemming from the labor 
market participation of the female. We distinguish a traditional family, in which the woman is 
a  full-time  housewife,  and  a  non-traditional  family,  in  which  the  female  is  prevalently 
employed in the labor market. We present the results of the application to Italian household 
data based on this policy-relevant distinction. 
,QJHQHUDOWKLVVWXG\UHSUHVHQWVDQHIIRUWLQOLQHZLWK3KLSSV¶H[KRUWDWLRQWR
reconcile the literature on decision-making within families and the literature on the estimation 
of equivalence scales similar to the research endeavor undertaken by Browning, Chiappori 
and Lewbel (2006). The collective specification of a complete gender specific demand system 
and its application to the estimation of the sharing of the full cost of children between parents 
are original contributions of the present study.   3 
The next section presents the derivation of a gender specific demand system derived 
from a collective decision model of the family incorporating household production. The third 
section is devoted to the econometric specification of the individual demand systems and the 
associated sharing rule between husband and wife. The method adopted to describe how the 
full cost of a child is shared within the couple is presented in section 4. The income and time 
use data of Italian households are described in section 5. The subsequent section reports the 
results. Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2.  The model: a Gender Specific Demand System within a Collective Model with 
Household Production 
We  consider  the  household  as  both  a  production  and  a  consumption  unit.  We 
characterize  household  production  by  assuming  that  the  domestic  good  xz  is  produced  at 
home using a strictly increasing, at least twice-differentiable, and concave technology g(h
1, 
h
2; d) which depends on time spent on household production activities by each member of the 
couple h
i, and a vector of exogenous characteristics d=d{ds, d-s}  which is composed by the 
sub-vectors of house characteristics ds and demographic characteristics of the household d-s: 
 . , ; ,
2 1   d d h h g x s s z     
In our set up, household production xz is neither observable nor marketable and is exchanged 
in the home market at an implicit price pz that varies across households, but it is the same for 
both members as a result of the efficiency assumption. Aggregate household production is 
privately consumed so that 
2 1
z z z x x x    . The notation 1 and 2 refers to husband and wife, 
respectively
1. We do not distinguish between different household products, such as household 
chores and childcare, and we do not observe market purchased inputs used in production. Nor 
we know who does what in the household. As a consequence, we cannot separate individual 
contributions to household production and thus define individual specific cost functions. The 
adopted technological relationship describing household production assumes that a) there is 
absence of joint production (Pollak and Wachter 1975, Graham and Green 1984, Kerkhofs 
and Kooreman 2003) in the sense that home production time is not a direct source of utility as 
leisure and is spent in one activity at a time, b) time used both in home production and market 
activities is equally productive, c) returns to scale are constant. 
                                                 
1 The superscript notation is associated with endogenous variables, while subscripts index exogenous variables.   4 
  In line with these assumptions, in the first stage, the household determines the optimal 
allocation of time spent by each member in household production by minimizing  
  ^ `   x d h h g h    w +    h    w Min
z  
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to obtain the cost function Cz(w1,w2,xz;d). Because the level of the household product cannot 
be  observed,  then  we  assume  that  the  cost  function  is  homothetic  Cz(w1,w2,xz;d)= 
cz(w1,w2;d)xz and the underlying domestic production technology is linearly homogeneous 
and exhibits constant returns to scale. The household specific imputed price of the domestic 
good pz is endogenously determined as (Gronau 1973, Apps and Rees 1996, 2002):  
d) ; w , (w
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and corresponds to the unit cost function cz(w1,w2;d). At equilibrium, profit from household 
production is zero and is, therefore, irrelevant to learn how profits from household production 
are shared within the household.  
Consumption  and  production  decisions  are  separable,  in  the  sense  that  production 
allocation decisions do not affect consumption choices, because of the constant returns to 
scale technology (Chiappori 1997, Rapoport and Sofer 2004). As a result, we can describe the 
household economy within a collective approach treating the consumption and production 
decision spheres as separate. Unlike the traditional approach, which considers the household 
as the basic decision unit with a joint preference structure, collective models describe the 
household as a group of individuals each of whom is characterized by specific preferences 
and  investigate  how  the  decision  process  is  influenced  by  prices,  incomes  and  other 
exogenous factors. We assume that each adult member of the household obtains utility from 
the private consumption of a composite good xm, a composite home produced good xz, and 
leisure l. Leisure is time that is devoted neither to work in the market nor work at home. 
Utility also depends on individual exogenous characteristics d-s to account for heterogeneity 
in behavior. Each member of the household maximizes egoistic preferences, in the sense that 
their utility only depends on their own consumption and leisure DQGQRWRQWKHRWKHUVSRXVH¶V
utility, as shown by the following program: 
(1)                 d    ; l   , x   , x    U     - 1   +     d   ; l   , x   , x   U   Max  
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where  P   P w1,w2,y1,y2,pm,ds,J   is the implicit Pareto weight of eDFKPHPEHU¶VXWLOLW\LQ
WKHFROOHFWLYHGHFLVLRQSURFHVV,WLVDFRQWLQXRXVO\GLIIHUHQWLDEOHIXQFWLRQRIWKHPRGHO¶V
exogenous  variables:  individual  wages  wi,  non-labor  incomes  yi,  prices  pm,  individual 
exogenous  attributes  d-s  shifting  both  preferences  and  weight,  and  distribution  factors  J  
affecting only the Pareto weight (Browning, Chiappori and Lechene 2006). Note that the 
Pareto weight does not depend on pz , because pz  is a function of w1,w2,d which are already 
SUHVHQWLQȝRapoport, Sofer 2004, Kaludgina, Ratchenko, Sofer 2009). The assumption of 
constant returns to scale of the production technology and separability of the production and 
consumption decision spheres ensure that equilibrium prices pz(w1,w2,d) are independent of 
ERWKGLVWULEXWLRQIDFWRUVȖDQGH[RJHQRXVQRQ-labor income  y. For the same reasons, the 
Pareto weight is independent of house characteristics ds that belong to the production sphere 
only.
2 In a bargaining perspective, the weight  > @   1 , 0  P  describes the distribution of power 
within the household (Chiappori 1992, Browning and Chiappori 1998, Donni 2003). 
The household budget constraint is expressed in terms of the household full income 
given by the sum of individual earnings evaluated at his/her own market wage, the sum of 
non labor income specific for each agent, i y , and the amount of the domestic good. T is total 
time  endowment  excluding  time  devoted  to  rest.  It  is  allocated  to  market  activities  o
i, 
household production hi and privately consumed leisure l
i. Given the assumption that the 
household production exhibits constant returns to scale, the full income constraint can be 
rewritten as: 









m m y h o w x p x p ) (  
where household income is given by the sum of the returns from labor supplied both outside 
and inside the household and non wage income yi specific for each agent. 
                                                 
2 Rapoport, Sofer and Solaz (2009), in analogy with the distribution factors affecting the distribution rule but not preferences, 
WHUP VXFK SURGXFWLRQ FKDUDFWHULVWLFV ³SXUH SURGXFWLRQ IDFWRUV´ EHFDXVH DIIHFW WKH SURGXFWLRQWHFKQRORJ\ RQO\ OHDYLQJ
preferences unchanged.   6 
Assuming that agents are egoistic and recalling that consumption is purely private in 
our model, Pareto efficiency implies that program in (1) can be decentralized as a second 
stage maximization problem of a single household member facing the own budget constraint: 
 
(2)                     
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where  Ii(.) is the sharing rule which summarizes WUDQVIHUVEHWZHHQFRXSOH¶VPHPEHUVDVD
function of exogenous variables affecting the distribution of bargaining power and resources 
within the household. It can be shown that the sharing rule Ii is a monotonic transformation 
of  the  Pareto  weight  P  (Chiappori  1988,  1992,  Browning,  Chiappori  and  Lewbel  2006, 
Browning, Chiappori and Weiss 2009).  
The intra-household allocation rule is not directly observable and must be deduced 
from  the  information  available  on  assignable  goods.  The  collective  approach  makes  no 
assumption  about  the  decision  process.  It  only  requires  that  the  outcome  of  the  decision 
process is Pareto efficient. Decisions take place as if they were made within a two-stage 
budgeting process. Total household income is allocated to single members according to a 
predetermined sharing rule, which defines the intra-household distribution of income. Then 
each member chooses the preferred utility-maximizing bundle of goods and leisure facing an 
individual budget constraint. 
Individual  demand  functions  ) , , , , , , , ( 2 1 2 1 , , s z m
i
l z m d y y w w p p x  J can  be  derived  as  a 
solution of program (2): 
 
) ); , , , , , , ( , , , ( ~ (.) 2 1 2 1 1 1
1 1
s s m z m m m d d y y w w p w p p x x     J I   ) ); , , , , , , ( , , , ( ~ (.) 2 1 2 1 2 2
2 2
s s m z m m m d d y y w w p w p p x x     J I  
   
) ), , , , , , , ( , , , ( ~ (.) 2 1 2 1 1 1
1 1
s s m z m z z d d y y w w p w p p   x x     J I   ) ); , , , , , , ( , , , ( ~ (.) 2 1 2 1 2 2
2 2
s s m z m z z d d y y w w p w p p x x     J I  
   
) ); , , , , , , ( , , , ( ~ (.) 2 1 2 1 1 1
1 1
s s m z m l l d d y y w w p w p p   x x     J I   ) ); , , , , , , ( , , , ( ~ (.) 2 1 2 1 2 2
2 2
s s m z m l l d d y y w w p w p p   x x     J I  
 
 
The system of equations is a gender specific demand system incorporating the sharing rule in 
structural form. This is in fact the main difference with Apps and Rees (1996). Note further 
that a) yi DQGWKHVSRXVH¶VZDJHDFWDVGLVWULEXWLRQIDFWRUVȖEHFDXVHWKH\DIIHFWWKHVKDULQJ  7 
rule but not preferences, b) the price of the market good pm can be normalized to one as in 
Apps and Rees (1996),  and c) the shadow  price  pz(w1,w2,d)  of the domestic good  is  not 
included in the sharing rule as for the Pareto weight (Rapoport and Sofer 2004; Kaludgina, 
Ratchenko, Sofer 2009).  
 
 
3.  Econometric Specification and Estimation 
The chosen structure of preferences is based on the Gorman polar form
3 linear in 
individual  full  income  Ii  which  is  demographically  transformed  using  the  translating 
technique (Barten 1964, Pollak and Wales 1981, Lewbel 1985). The associated indirect utility 
functions for individual i=1,2 are:  
 
(3)                      
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where  ln 
T
i  (ds,pi)   tk
i(ds)ln(pik )
k ¦ ,  for  k=m,z,l,  is  the  gender-specific  fixed  cost 
component  associated  with  the  demographic  characteristics.  Note  that  for  notational 
convenience  we  pose  pl=w,  and  l z m k x x x q , ,   .  The  function  t
i
k(d-s)  is  the  k
th  translating 






-s), where n=1,..,N indexes the household 
FKDUDFWHULVWLFV³QXPEHURIFKLOGUHQ´E\DJHFODVVDQGWKHVTXDUHGWRWDOQXPEHURIFKLOGUHQ
The price indexes Ai(p) and Bi(p) take the translog and Cobb-Douglas form respectively: 
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3 It is interesting to note that the indirect utility function with a Gorman polar form implies a unitary model and the pooling 
of incomes because the aggregate demand behaves as if it were the demand of a single consumer (Bergstrom 1997:10).  As 
pointed out by Bergstrom himself (1997: 10), in the case of a translation, utilities may be different for different people. The 
indirect utility described in equation (3) incorporates both translating and scaling of the income term.   8 
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Ii(.) is the sharing rule with the following form: 
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where the function m(w1,w2,y1,y2,d-s) has as arguments information about the own and other 
DJHQW¶V ZDJHV QRQ-labor  income  and  demographic  characteristics.  The  chosen  functional 
form is exponential. Note that the m() function acts as a scaling function of personal full 
income capturing the size of the intra-household transfers. The sharing rule for the other agent 
is  given  by  I2 =Y-I1=Y 1+Y 2-Y 1m()=Y 2+Y 1(1-m()).  Therefore,  the  sum  shared  between 
individuals 1 and 2 is Y 1(1-m()). The amount Y 1(m()-1) offered by individual 1 corresponds 
to the amount received Y 1(1-m()) by the partner. The variables that are positively correlated 
with the bargaining power of one spouse should positively affect the own consumption share. 
This specification of the distribution function explains how the transfers between wives and 
husbands are realized. Note that 0<mY/ Y 1. If m=1, then I1=Y 1 and if m=Y/ Y 1, then I 2=0 
and  I1=Y. The range of the modifying function  m(.) describes the direction of the intra-
household transfer: if m(.) is less than one, then the wife receives the transfer; the recipient is 
the  husband  otherwise.  The  modifying  function  0<m<Y1  can  also  be  seen  as  an  index 
function correcting Y1 which is observed with error given the incomplete information about 
all possible assignable goods in the household (Menon and Perali 2009). 
The estimation technique of the sharing rule is based on an analogy borrowed from 
the literature of modifying functions used to incorporate demographic and other exogenous 
effects into demand systems (Pollak and Wales 1981, Lewbel 1985: Theorem 8, Perali 2003) 
and  from  studies  estimating  household  technologies  (Bollino,  Perali  and  Rossi  2000, 
Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel 2006). The approach proposed in this paper to estimate the 
sharing rule is similar to the method adopted by Browning et al. (1994) where the estimation 
of the structural form, which is non linear in the parameters, is conducted directly given a   9 
specific parametric functional form of the sharing rule. This technique is simpler than the 
econometric strategy followed by Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002) which recovers the 
sharing rule indirectly by first estimating the linear reduced form and then applying, in the 
second stage, the theoretical restrictions identifying the parameters of the sharing rule.  
Like  sharing  rules,  demographic  functions  are  not  observable  (Goldberger  1972). 
When demographically modifying functions interact with exogenous prices or income, as in 
the present case, it is possible to identify the demographic parameters of interest provided that 
there is sufficient information in the data. Arias et al. (2004) show that the parameters of the 
sharing rule, where individual full incomes are modified by an income scaling function, such 
as m(.), are identifiable.  
We assume that the household cost function takes the translog functional form. The 
unit cost function can be recovered from the estimates of the share equations associated with 
the cost of time allocated to household production by each member of the couple as follows: 
(8)               
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The price of the domestic good has been computed as the exponent of the unit cost function: 
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where w1 is the husband exogenous wage, w2 is the wife potential wage when unemployed, 
s d includes individual attributes and ds describes a vector of characteristics of the house such 
as size, number of bathrooms and other characteristics.
4 
The econometric execution develops in the following steps:  
1)  estimation of the potential wage for non working women of traditional households; 
2)  estimation  of  the  household  production  technology  jointly  as  in  equation  (8)  by 
maximum  likelihood  with  symmetry  and  linear  homogeneity  as  maintained 
                                                 
4 Alternatively, the price of domestic production can be evaluated at the market price of the equivalent service price which is 
exogenous to the household (Jenkins and O'Leary 1994, 1995, 1996). The market approach is plausible when the domestic 
production is marketable, as it is the case of agricultural households or household-enterprises, or when it can be substituted 
with goods and services bought on an outside market at a given price. For example, meals can be taken at home or at a 
restaurant, a maid can be hired to clean the house, and so on. In this case, the market price of the equivalent service 
determines  the  trade-off  between  internal  production  and  outside  trade.  This  method  requires  a  distinction  between 
different types of domestic work and the evaluation of each one to the corresponding price of market specialists. Because 
information on specific household activities was not available, we could not apply this approach to our analysis.   10 
hypotheses and derivation of the implicit price of the domestic good    pz as in equation 
(9);  
3)  joint estimation of the gender specific demand system described in equation (6).  
The stochastic disturbances added to each equation are meant to capture measurement errors 
as well as unobserved heterogeneity in tastes for different goods and assumed to be jointly 
and normally distributed across equation. The restrictions across gender-specific sub-systems 
of equations generated by the sharing rule explain the relation across the error components of 
each equation in the system. Given the cross-section nature of the data and the structure of the 
model, the error terms are heteroscedastic. This feature has been corrected computing a White 
consistent error variance-covariance matrix. Therefore, the parameters of the gender-specific 
sub-system of equations in equation (6) are estimated jointly using a generalized least square 
estimator which corresponds to the iterative version of the SUR estimator. In this study, the 
omitted  equations  are  the  consumption  equations  for  both  genders.  The  iterative  SUR 
estimator guarantees that the results are invariant to the omitted equation, which, in our case, 
is the consumption good equation.  
 
4.  The Sharing of the Full Cost of Children  
The full cost of a child is composed by the value of market goods, the value of non market 
goods, and the value of time devoted to child care (Bradbury 2004b, 2008). In turn, the full 
cost of a child is made up of a need component, given by the costs for the necessary goods 
and a minimal level of parental time, and the cost for goods and time which are not necessary. 
In fact, Bradbury (2004a, 2008) distinguishes the cost of maintaining a child associated with 
WKHFKLOGQHHGVFRUUHVSRQGLQJWRWKHFRQFHSWRIHTXLYDOHQFHVFDOHIURPWKH³SULFH´Rf a child 
associated with the cost of rearing a child. This distinction is important because the need 
component may not vary significantly with income (Lewbel 1989, Blackorby and Donaldson 
1991),  while  the  full  cost  does.  In  this  study,  we  are  mainly  concerned  with  the  need 
component of the full cost of children. Knowledge of the rule governing the allocation of 
resources within a household further allows us to estimate how much of the full cost of a 
child is borne by each parent.  
To accomplish this task, we construct the full cost of a child as a cost of characteristic 
index (Lewbel 1997, Ebert and Moyes 2003, 2009) based on the full costs of maintaining a 
child borne by each household member, that is, total expenses required to purchase market 
goods, services and time. In this framework, we define the share of the cost of maintaining a   11 
FKLOGDVWKHLQFUHDVHLQHDFKPHPEHU¶VIXOOLQFRPHUHTXLUHGWRPDLQWDLQWKHLQGLYLGXDOZHOIDUH
that he or she could attain when living in a childless couple (Pollak and Wales 1992). From 
the indirect utility function described in equation (3), we derive the cost functions for each 
member of the couple: 
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 ln ln . ln ln ln
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corresponding to the level of individual full income scaled to account for the transfer realized 
through the intra-household distribution process. As for conventional equivalence scales, we 
define the cost of maintaining a child as the relative cost associated with the characteristic 
³SUHVHQFHRIDFKLOG´in the comparison household f: 
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where  the  demographic  profile  j=f,r  of  the  reference  household  r  and  the  comparison 
household f differ only for the attribute associated with the presence of an extra-child. The 
translating demographic modification of the adopted demand system generates equivalence 
scales that are exact by construction (Blackorby and Donaldson 1991) or independent of the 
base income (IB), or utility level, chosen for comparison (Lewbel 1989). IB preferences are 
separable in u and d as follows:  
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Engel curves associated with this structure are linear in income and parallel as family size 
increases. The horizontal difference between two parallel curves is the cost of a child that 
stays  constant  as  income  increases.  The  implied  cost  of  living  index  (12)  can  then  be 
decomposed in the following way:   12 
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For the chosen structure of preferences described in equation (10) and (11), the total cost of a 
child is the weighted sum of the separable demographic components     
T  1 and    
T  2 for the 
comparison household f, where the weights are the relative contributions of each parent to the 
full household costs. Note that the term      i
Tr  is equal to 1 for the reference family being a 
couple without children.  
The relative contribution of each parent to the full cost of children can be computed as 
the ratio between the difference of the cost  borne by each parent  of the household  with 
children and the cost incurred by the member of a childless couple of the same gender to the 
full costs of a child computed as the difference in the two full income levels: 
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In order to better understand how the composition of goods and time changes as the child 
grow  older,  we  decompose  the  full  costs  incurred  by  each  parent  in  terms  of  the  single 
components using the definition of the translating term      i
T  as follows:  
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given that      i
Tf  =1 for  0   
r n
s d , k=x,z,l and i=1,2. The term 
i
k M =   p   k
d s
i
 W can be interpreted 
as a good specific p-GHSHQGHQWIXOOFRVWLQGH[RIWKHFKDUDFWHULVWLFµSUHVHQFHRIDFKLOG¶
InWHUHVWLQJO\WKHGHPRJUDSKLFSDUDPHWHUĲ
i
kn describes how each parent substitutes goods xm, 
xz and xl in response to the presence of a child of different age. This is because in the system 
of  share  equations  (6)  the  demographic  parameters  are  restricted  as   13 






k d t W Æ  6kW
i
kn  =0  due  to  the  adding  up  restriction.  Inspection  of 
equation (16) reveals that the equivalence scale is independent of u. The fixed cost      i
Tf  is 
the committed consumption associated with the presence of a child whose composition varies 
as the age of the child changes. 
 
 
5.  Data 
The  empirical  analysis  is  based  on  a  sub-sample  of  the  1995  Bank  of  Italy  Survey  on 
Household  Income and Wealth (BdI). The survey reports data on hours of market  work, 
earnings,  non-labor  incomes,  and  demographic  characteristics  specific  to  each  family 
member.  The survey also records information about aggregate food consumption and total 
expenditure. As it is common practice in income surveys, expenditures are not assignable to 
family members.  
  Information on hours spent on domestic production was obtained by imputation of this 
value from the 1989 ISTAT Time Budget Survey (TBS). The survey records time use by 
means of interviews and daily dairy during different days of the week for each individual in 
the family more than 3 years old. The time endowment of 16 hours/day, that is 112 hours a 
week, net of the time for rest and personal care of 8 hours, is distributed between market and 
non-market time. Non-market time is then divided between pure leisure and domestic time 
that  includes  activities  such  as  household  chores,  childcare,  shopping  and  house 
administration.   
  The integration of the statistical information available in different data sets can be 
tackled by means of imputation procedures (Singh et al'¶2UD]LR'L=LRDQG6FDQX
2006; Gallezzoni et al. 2008). Data on time use has been matched with the Bank of Italy 
income survey using regression techniques applied to complementary surveys
5. The statistical 
matching is based on the estimation of unpaid work equations by type (housework, childcare, 
shopping  and  house  administration),  gender  and  days  of  the  week,  for  couples  with  and 
                                                 
5 The method applied to merge the sample surveys used in the paper is presented in detail in Addabbo and Caiumi (2003). To 
impute the variable of interest, y', into the survey where it is unobserved, the authors take the conditional mean of the 
regression obtained where the survey is observed, E(y|X1)=ȕX1, and substitute the exogenous variables drawn from the 
former survey, X0. Following the approach proposed by Kennedy (1983), the standard error of the regression is added, in 
order to reproduce as best as possible the unobserved heterogeneity not captured by the conditional mean of the regression. 
The variable of interest is then computed as y'=ȕX0+ıİ. The authors control for the requirements that the complementary 
datasets should share a common set of conditioning variables and should be drawn from the same population. This merging 
procedure provides imputed hours of  work  by  different  unpaid activities  similar,  in  terms of  the  distribution  of  first 
moments, to the ones observed for the selected Time Budget Survey sub-sample.  
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without children conditional on a set of socio-demographic characteristics of the household. 
The variables used for the imputation are individual characteristics such as age,  years of 
education, employment condition, type of job (industry, position, part time job), partner's 
socio-demographic  characteristics,  area  where  the  family  lives,  number  and  presence  of 
children in different age groups.  
  The sample is restricted to married couples with age from 19 to 64 and consists of 
3858  records.  Following  Apps  and  Rees  (1996,  2002),  the  sample  is  split  into  two 
VXEVDPSOHVWKHVXEVDPSOHRIµWUDGLWLRQDOVLQJOHHDUQHU¶IDPLOLHVZKHUHWKHIHPDOHSDUWQHULV
D KRXVHZLIH DQG WKH VXEVDPSOH RI µQRQ-WUDGLWLRQDO GRXEOH HDUQHU¶ IDPLOLHV ZKHUH ERWK
members are employed at least 30 hours a week.  
This selection criterion gives a sample of 660 observations representing the traditional 
households,  and  558  observations  for  non-traditional  ones.  We  carry  out  our  analysis 
maintaining this selection to explain how the presence of children affects consumption/leisure 
choices of one-earner and double-earner households.
6 
The descriptive statistics of the variables used in the econometric analysis are reported 
in table 1. The upper part of the table (table 1.a) describes the time allocation in market, home 
and pure leisure activities. Both in traditional and non-traditional households the husband 
works about 43 hours per week at a wage that does not differ significantly between the two 
type of households. Traditional households have about 1.3 times the number of children that 
non-traditional families have. In non-traditional families, working time and earnings are not 
evenly distributed between husband and wife. Women work outside the home almost as many 
hours as men do. However, the domestic working time is ten times higher. On the other hand, 
both female wage and non-labor income are much lower than male ones. Inspection of table 
1.b also reveals that for one-earner households, the housewife unpaid working time is about 
30 percent higher than the husband total working time.  
Individual full incomes are individual expenditures constructed by assigning an equal 
allocation of non-assignable household consumption of market and domestic goods among 
the members plus the value of leisure consumed by each individual, which we assume to be 
                                                 
6 It could be noted that families with children are likely to be a self-selected group and conclusion about how family size 
influence allocation decisions should account of this selection. We argue that the correction for selection bias is negligible. 
Also the use of cross-sectional data do not allow to account for changes in labor status, for example women may go from 
working to non working when their first child is born, or they can move into and out of part-time work, even if the latter 
possibility is highly restricted in Italy.   15 
assignable because enjoyed mainly privately.
7 Unearned incomes do not include returns from 
capital accumulation in order to avoid further endogeneity problems with past and current 
labor supply (Lundberg, Pollak and Wales 1997).  
We assume that the bargaining process over the share of income is influenced by 
market wages even if an individual is not employed in the market. This assumption implies 
that the threat point depends on the wage that the individual would receive if he or she chose 
to work. Potential wage rates are predicted from a wage equation estimated by applying the 
Heckman  procedure  to  account  for  self-selection  bias.  The  results  are  reported  in  the 
Appendix  only  for  women  in  the  traditional  household  because  in  our  sample  men  are 
employed for at least 30 hours a week. The estimation is based on the 1995 Bank of Italy 
sample of married couples. Inspection of table A.1 reveals that the presence of children, as it 
is plausible to expect in Italy, significantly affects the participation decision of women. The 
likelihood  of  a  woman  being  employed  is  positively  affected  by  the  age  and  level  of 
education  and  negatively  affected  by  the  regional  unemployment  rate.  The  working 
conditions of the partner do not affect the participation decision of the woman. The level of 
household income does not significantly affect the probability of a woman being employed. 
7KHVSHFLILFDWLRQRIWKHZDJHHTXDWLRQLQFOXGHVYDULDEOHVGHVFULELQJWKHKRXVHKROGPHPEHUV¶
endowment of human capital and regional dummies to account for wage discrimination. The 
estimated rate of return to schooling, expressed in years of education, is 8 percent. Age does 
QRW KDYH D VWDWLVWLFDOO\ VLJQLILFDQW HIIHFW RQ ZRPHQ¶V ZDJH :RUN H[SHULHQFH LQFUHDVHV
ZRPHQ¶VZDJHE\SHUFHQW:DJHVDUHVLJQLILFDQWO\ORZHUIRUZRPHQOLYLQJLQWKH6RXWK
West (16 percent less than those living in the North), in the South East (10 percent less) and 
in the Centre of Italy (-11 percent).  
 
 
6.  Results 
The household production technology has been estimated as in equation (8). The estimates, 
both for traditional and non-traditional households, are reported in table 2. For traditional 
households, the estimation technique is IV, because of the endogeneity of female wages as 
confirmed by the Durbin-Wu-+DXVPDQ¶V WHVW
8  We correct  for this source of  endogeneity 
selecting a set of exogenous regressors after testing for their weakness with an F-test and for 
                                                 
7 Browning and Bonke (2006) distinguish three items categories: 1) assignable items because bought exclusively for one 
member, b) assignable items because bought exclusively for the other member, c) non-assignable items bought for the 
household such as food.  We assume that non-assignable goods are divided equally in half, or fairly, in the household. 
8 As expected, we find that wages for females employed in the labor market, according to the same test, are exogenous.   16 
the  presence  of  over-identifying  restrictions  using  Sargan-+DQVHQ¶V WHVW The  set  of 
instruments used include size of the dwelling (in square-meters), number of bathrooms, site 
(urbanUXUDOVXEXUEVVLWH¶VHYDOXDWLRQKXVEDQG¶VDJH-FXEHGZLIH¶VDJH-cubed. The signs 
are consistent with expectations. Both technologies satisfy the curvature conditions, as shown 
in the bottom portion of the table reporting the Allen elasticities of substitution for wages. The 
own-elasticity of substitution associated with the wage of the husband (V11) is ten times larger 
in double earner families. Otherwise, the estimated technologies do not differ substantially 
across household types. 
  The collective model of consumption-leisure choice (equation 6) has been estimated 
for a sample of double and one earner households and for other sub-samples referring to 
household types at different stages of the life cycle in order to capture differences in behavior 
associated with cohort effects and the presence of children. We have selected families without 
children,  families  with  children  under  six,  and  families  without  children  under  six  and 
husbands older than 40. The estimation has been carried out with homogeneity and symmetry 
restrictions imposed (Table A.2 and A.3). 
  Table  3.1  and  Table  3.2  present  the  compensated  price  elasticities  describing  the 
curvature properties of the individual expenditure functions at the data means. In general, the 
signs  of  the  diagonal  elements  of  the  gender-specific  compensated  price  elasticities  are 
negative and very significant for double earner families both in the aggregate and within 
groups (Table 3.1). The Slutsky requirements (Apps and Rees 1997) are respected for the 
single earner households at the aggregate level, but the compliance is lower for the selected 
groups (Table 3.2). This is probably due to the differential involvement of the female member 
in non-market activities when children are not present or other aspects related to unobserved 
heterogeneity. For the husbands of single earner households the own effects are in general 
weak, independently of the family type, and not statistically different from zero. For double 
earner households, it is interesting to note that husbaQGV¶EHKDYLRULVQRWDIIHFWHGE\WKH
presence of children, while wives react by becoming less sensitive to wage changes. In fact, 
the  female  demand  for  leisure  is  significantly  more  inelastic  with  respect  to  the  own 
opportunity cost. Also, the magnitude of the impact of the value of household production is 
significantly smaller for the mother, decreasing from -1.70 without a child to -0.05 with a 
young child. These results may indicate that, when a child arrives, women in non-traditional 
households employ mRUHWLPHWRKRPHDFWLYLWLHVZKLOHKXVEDQGV¶DOORFDWLRQUHPDLQVDOPRVW
unchanged.     17 
  In general, leisure is a luxury good. The demand elasticity of leisure with respect to 
income is greater than one for both couple members in all family types. It is interesting to 
note that it is higher for the households with small children. On the other hand, the income 
elasticity of the domestic good is significantly different from zero and negative for wives 
belonging to older non-traditional families, while in traditional families the elasticities are all 
negative. This means that the demand for the domestic product decreases as the amount of 
available resources increases. 
  The impact of a change in wage of agent i on j¶VFRQVXPSWLRQRIPDUNHWDQGGRPHVWLF
goods and leisure acts as an income effect through the sharing function. Table 4 reports the 
estimated parameters of the sharing rule for each household type and the comparison between 
the  estimated  I1/Y=Y 1m(.)/Y  and  the  actual  Y 1/Y  full  income  share  of  the  husband.  The 
reported parameters correspond to the exponents in equation (7) with the exception of the 
parameter associated with the demographic variable that has been dropped from the final 
specification of the double logarithmic sharing function because demographic factors do not 
add useful information for the identification of the sharing rule. The interpretation of the 
effects may be illustrated with an example. Consider a change in w2 for all traditional families 
included in  the sample. A 10 percent  increase in  the potential wage of the non working 
women increases by 7 percent the value of the scaling function  m(.). If we suppose that     
m(.)=1 before the salary increase, then the 7 percent increase of m(.) corresponds to a positive 
transfer from the wife to the husband of Y 1m(.). At the mean full income level of 3.475.000 £ 
(Liras) (see table 1.b) corresponding to  about  1795 Euros, the transfer  amounts to  about 
243.250 £ (Liras) or about 122 Euros.  
  Most parameter estimates are statistically  significant  at  conventional  levels  for  all 
distribution factors, except for the male non-labor income variable. The effect of this variable 
is weak for both members, with the exception of non-traditional families without children, 
due to the fact that non-labor income records a high percentage of zero values. Keeping in 
mind the specification of the sharing rule described in equation (7), the positive sign of the 
coefficients for the whole sample of non-traditional households indicates that an increase in 
labor and non-ODERULQFRPHRIERWKPHPEHUVJLYHVUDLVHWRDQLQFUHDVHRIWKHKXVEDQG¶VRZQ
share,  because  the  wife  transfers  resources  to  the  husband,  while  the  husband  keeps  the 
resources for himself. This is not the case for childless non-traditional households. As is 
suggested by the negative sign associated with both the wage and non-labor income variables, 
WKH ZLIH¶V EHKDYLRU FDQ EH LQWHUSUHWHG DV HJRLVWLF ERWK IRU FKLOGOHVV FRXSOHV DQG IRU  18 
households with young children. On the other hand, for the older cohort, where the female 
wage variable is associated with a positive sign, the female transfers part of her resources to 
the husband. The husband does not reciprocate this altruistic behavior. The altruistic behavior 
of the female prevails also at the level of the aggregate sample. 
  The  estimated  sharing  rule  for  traditional  households  reveals  that  in  single-earner 
KRXVHKROGV WKH ZLIH EHKDYHV DOWUXLVWLFDOO\ LQ DOO FDVHV ,Q IDFW DQ LQFUHDVH LQ WKH ZLIH¶V
SRWHQWLDOZDJHLPSOLHVDQLQFUHDVHLQWKHKXVEDQG¶s share. On the other hand, an increase in 
WKHKXVEDQG¶VZDJHUDLVHVKLVWUDQVIHUVWRWKHZLIHWKURXJKWKHOLQNY2=Y-I1. A negative sign 
for the male wage can therefore be associated with altruistic behavior from the husband. This 
pattern  suggests  that  the  sub-groups  of  traditional  households  of  our  sample  behave  as  
³PXWXDOH[FKDQJH´HFRQRPLHV7KHEHKDYLRURIWKHFRXSOHLVDOWUXLVWLFLQWKHVHQVHWKDWERWK
members are willing to share resources. In the case referring to all traditional households, the 
impact of the male wage on the share  I1 is positive and statistically significantly different 
from zero. This sign change stems from the fact that the aggregate sample includes other 
households not included in the selected sub-samples and is therefore not in contrast with the 
evidence shown for the other selected traditional household types.  
  Inspection of the bottom of table 4 reveals that the actual and predicted share of the 
household full income pertaining to the husband does not differ significantly at the means. As 
shown in Figure 1, the actual and estimated shares have a similar pattern contained within the 
expected 0-1 bounds.  Figure 1 compares the splines of the actual and estimated male share of 
household  full  income  across  income  quintiles  for  both  non-traditional  and  traditional 
households. At low income levels, both predicted and actual values for both household types 
show a more egalitarian distribution of resources as a result of a more equal distribution of 
power. 
  The presence of a child increases the time spent on household production activities, 
including childcare, at the expense of the consumption of leisure. Therefore, in order to avoid 
the double-count of the value of time, we present the cost of a child based exclusively on the 
value of the consumption of market goods and domestic product.  Table 5 shows the cost of a 
FKLOGE\DJHSURILOHHTXDWLRQDQGWKHUHODWLYHFRQWULEXWLRQRIHDFKSDUHQWWRWKH³IXOO´
cost (equation 15). The equivalence scale for a child less than two years old is 23 percent of 
the cost of living of a childless couple corresponding to 47 percent of the cost of an adult 
equivalent.  The  cost  of  an  older  child  decreases  because  both  the  market  and  product 
component decrease. The cost of a child is comparable across household types. However, the   19 
SDWWHUQ RI UHODWLYH FRQWULEXWLRQ WR WKH ³IXOO´ FRVW UHIOHFWV WKH GLIIHUHQW RUJDQL]DWLRQ RI
traditional and non-traditional households. In households where both members work and the 
FKLOGLVOHVVWKDQWZR\HDUVROGWKHIDWKHU¶VFRQWULEXWLRQFRUUHVSRQGVWRSHUFHQWRIWKHWRWDO
increase in full costs due to the presence of a child. The relative contribution is in the same 
proportion for both traditional and non-traditional households when the child is less than two 
years  old.  When  both  parents  work,  the  mother  bears  most  of  the  costs.  In  traditional 
households, the relative contribution of the father is larger than the contribution of the mother 
when the children are more than five years old. It is worthwhile to stress that the equivalence 
scales  presented  here,  which  are  independent  of  income  by  construction  as  explained  in 
Section 4, are not directly comparable with the full consumption equivalence scales presented 
in  Apps  and  Rees  (2002),  Bradbury  (2008),  and  Koulovatianos,  Schröder,  and  Schmidt 
(2009) that are clearly dependent on income and, in general, higher also at a chosen reference 
income level. 
  In order to isolate the single components of the full cost of a child, we compute the 
cost of living index associated with market goods, household production and leisure for both 
members of traditional and non-traditional households following the formalization described 
in equation (16). The decomposition is presented in Table 6.  In general, the pattern for 
traditional and non-traditional households is similar. The market goods component of the full 
cost of a child is smallest when compared to the size of the household product and leisure 
component.  This  pattern  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  Bank  of  Italy  income  survey 
underestimates expenditure information. In fact, the descriptive statistics in Table 1 show that 
the share of market goods is small in comparison to the share of household production and 
leisure. The household production component of the full cost of a child decreases as the child 
grows. With respect to childless couples, both parents of both household types increase their 
involvement in household production. For both members of non-traditional households the 
index is relatively higher. This evidence does not imply that the members of households 
where both work are also more involved in domestic activities. The index for traditional 
households, which compares the situation of a couple with a child and a childless couple, is 
relatively  lower  because  the  members  of  traditional  households  are,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
relatively more engaged in domestic activities. This commitment decreases as the child gets 
older. A higher investment in household production comes at the expense of the enjoyment of 
leisure, especially for mothers. Fathers do the same to a lesser extent.  
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7.  Conclusions 
  This study represents an effort to reconcile the literature on decision-making within 
families and the literature on the estimation of equivalence scales. Within the context of a 
collective  model,  we  estimate  a  gender-specific  demand  system  incorporating  the  rule 
adopted by traditional and non-traditional Italian households to share resources within the 
household and compute the cost of a child accounting for market, household products and 
time costs.  
  The main results can be highlighted as follows. Gender-specific demand systems are 
coherent with theory for non-traditional families and for traditional families at the aggregate. 
The estimates of the sharing rule show that in non-traditional families both without and with 
children, women maintain control over their resources. On the other hand, altruistic behavior 
in which both members are willing to share resources prevails in traditional families. In the 
presence of a child, the parental investment in household production increases, especially for 
mothers, at the expenses of the consumption of leisure. When the child is very young, this 
effect is relatively higher. In general, mothers bear more than half of the cost of the child with 
the exception of traditional households with  older children where the contribution  of the 
father becomes preponderant.  
  This study provides some comforting indications. Gender-specific demand systems 
can be robustly estimated. The structural estimation of the sharing rule within a complete 
demand system expressed in terms of full income is a practical alternative. The cost of a child 
FDQEHHIIHFWLYHO\GHFRPSRVHGLQWHUPVRIWKHZLYHVDQGKXVEDQGV¶UHODWLYHFontribution of 
market  goods,  household  products  and  leisure.  The  evidence  presented  in  this  work  also 
suggests  that  the  study  of  the  specification  of  gender  specific  demand  systems  and  the 
associated possibilities to measures how the costs of children are shared within household 
members is both a policy relevant and a scientifically interesting topic for further research. 
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Tab. 1  Descriptive Statistics 
a) Non-traditional (double earner) families 
 
All families 
    Families w/o 
children   
Families with 
children <6   
Families w/o 




Dev.    Mean 
Std. 
Dev.    Mean 
Std. 




Husband                       
H.rs of market work / week  42.93  7.17    42.98  7.11    42.87  7.25    42.47  6.80 
H.rs of domestic work / week  3.40  1.69    3.21  1.49    4.91  2.04    3.12  1.43 
H.rs of leisure  65.67  7.09    65.81  6.87    64.22  7.24    66.41  6.68 
Hourly wage/1000  14.10  10.85    13.15  8.52    14.24  12.38    14.97  12.94 
Non-labor income/ year  590.7  4872.1    854.1  4997.5    178.0  926.2    1033.9  6810.0 
Age  41.80  8.39    43.48  10.55    34.68  5.05    48.53  4.92 
Education (years)  10.60  3.88    9.98  3.86    11.51  3.39    9.83  4.18 
Share - leisure  0.62  0.10    0.62  0.11    0.62  0.11    0.62  0.10 
Share - domestic product  0.15  0.07    0.14  0.07    0.16  0.05    0.14  0.06 
Share - market goods  0.23  0.08    0.24  0.09    0.22  0.08    0.24  0.09 
Full income/month (000Lira)  5773.0  3282.7    5536.5  3049.4    5666.9  3147.9    6094.7  3788.9 
 
Wife                       
H.rs of market work / week  40.23  5.72    40.98  6.09    40.65  6.19    40.12  5.72 
H.rs of domestic work / week  31.20  6.22    29.50  6.19    33.21  5.65    31.31  6.22 
H.rs of leisure  40.57  7.82    41.52  8.10    38.14  7.44    40.57  8.09 
Hourly wage/1000  11.73  17.95    12.66  28.16    11.15  4.27    10.95  6.24 
Non-labor income / year  76.47  676.99    132.18  930.77    71.08  724.96    56.08  532.47 
Age  38.64  8.02    40.66  10.23    31.64  4.05    44.79  5.46 
Education (years)  10.73  3.77    10.07  3.93    12.11  3.19    9.75  4.06 
Share - leisure  0.46  0.11    0.46  0.12    0.45  0.10    0.44  0.11 
Share - domestic product  0.20  0.06    0.19  0.05    0.24  0.06    0.20  0.06 
Share - market goods  0.34  0.12    0.35  0.13    0.32  0.10    0.36  0.12 
Full income / month (000Lira)  3986.70  3869.74    4177.70  5959.09    3745.89  1223.09    3921.81  1743.28 
                       
Price - domestic good 
(000Lira)  12.30  23.63    13.50  37.43    11.52  4.16    11.42  6.53 
No. Children  1.38  0.88    0.00  0.00    1.15  0.38    1.52  0.79 
No. Children <6  0.26  0.49    0.00  0.00    1.15  0.38    0.00  0.00 
North-West  (%)  0.29  0.45    0.33  0.47    0.26  0.44    0.28  0.45 
North-East   (%)  0.26  0.44    0.31  0.46    0.28  0.45    0.25  0.44 
Centre          (%)  0.22  0.41    0.22  0.41    0.15  0.36    0.24  0.43 
South           (%)  0.23  0.42    0.14  0.35    0.31  0.46    0.22  0.00 
               
Number of records  558    203    103    169 
 
 
   25 
b) Traditional families (one earner) 
 
All families 
   
Families w/o 
children   
Families with 
children <6   
Families w/o 




Dev.    Mean 
Std. 
Dev.    Mean 
Std. 




Husband                       
H.rs of market work / week  43.57  7.84    43.44  7.80    44.14  7.60    43.33  7.63 
H.rs of domestic work / week  2.11  1.18    2.04  0.91    3.52  1.84    1.71  0.74 
H.rs of leisure  66.32  7.75    66.52  7.67    64.34  7.47    66.96  7.53 
Hourly wage/1000  13.59  13.68    14.40  17.23    12.55  11.48    13.36  6.83 
Non-labor income/ year  794.4  4186.2    1335.6  5995.2    407.9  1437.2    560.3  3098.2 
Age  45.05  9.24    50.68  9.36    33.54  4.63    47.22  4.70 
Education (years)  8.84  3.68    8.73  4.01    9.93  3.54    8.54  3.65 
Share - leisure  0.64  0.10    0.64  0.11    0.63  0.11    0.64  0.10 
Share - domestic product  0.18  0.07    0.17  0.06    0.20  0.07    0.17  0.06 
Share - market goods  0.19  0.06    0.19  0.07    0.17  0.06    0.19  0.07 
Full income / month (000Lira)  5441.2  3896.5    5715.5  4825.5    4911.4  3282.5    5452.5  2224.6 
 
Wife                       
H.rs of market work / week  0.23  2.71    0.38  3.64    0.27  3.12    0.12  1.62 
H.rs of domestic work / week  55.51  7.12    52.23  6.00    57.12  7.15    56.77  6.24 
H.rs of leisure  56.26  7.59    59.39  6.93    54.61  7.78    55.11  6.78 
Hourly potential wage/1000  7.34  3.94    7.71  5.41    7.14  2.26    7.25  2.33 
Non-labor income / year  67.28  904.3    68.50  673.27    46.10  410.26    65.30  1040.8 
Age  41.34  9.44    47.29  9.62    29.37  4.85    43.09  5.14 
Education (years)  7.79  3.47    7.17  3.55    9.83  3.13    7.41  3.28 
Share - leisure  0.47  0.08    0.49  0.07    0.48  0.07    0.46  0.07 
Share - domestic product  0.25  0.05    0.23  0.04    0.28  0.05    0.25  0.04 
Share - market goods  0.27  0.08    0.28  0.08    0.24  0.07    0.29  0.08 
Full income / month (000Lira)  3474.94  1406.0    3695.21  1797.46    3253.59  1072.05    3468.59  1092.27 
                       
Price - domestic good (000Lira)  7.59  4.05    7.98  5.51    7.49  2.49    7.46  2.42 
No. Children  1.84  0.92    0.00  0.00    1.46  0.60    2.31  0.86 
No. Children <6  0.25  0.51    0.00  0.00    1.46  0.60    0.00  0.00 
North-West  (%)  0.17  0.37    0.19  0.39    0.20  0.40    0.16  0.36 
North-East   (%)  0.14  0.35    0.16  0.37    0.14  0.35    0.14  0.35 
Centre          (%)  0.20  0.40    0.23  0.42    0.17  0.38    0.19  0.39 
South           (%)  0.49  0.50    0.42  0.49    0.49  0.50    0.51  0.50 
                   
Number of records  660    161    117    175 
 
1RWHµ1RQ-WUDGLWLRQDOIDPLOLHV¶DUHVHOHFWHGDVWKRVHLQZKLFKERWKPHPEHUVZRUNPRUHWKDQ
hours DZHHNµ7UDGLWLRQDOIDPLOLHV¶GHQRWHIDPLOLHVZKHUHWKHIHPDOHSDUWQHULVDKRXVHZLIH   27 
Tab. 3.1   Compensated Price (ek) and Income Elasticities (e) by Gender and Family Type 
Non-traditional (Double Earner) Households 
  Husband    Wife    Shares 
  e1  e2   e3  e    e1  e2   e3  e    H  W 
       




**    -0.05
**  0.80
**  0.18  1.61
**    0.63  0.48 








**    0.15  0.20 








**    0.22  0.32 
without children       
1   -0.01
**  -0.51  -0.22
**  1.12




**    0.62  0.46 
2   0.26




**    0.14  0.19 
3   0.29
**  0.25  -0.23
**  0.81




**    0.24  0.35 
with children < 5 years old       
1   -0.01
**  0.36  0.38
**  1.65
**    -0.18  0.47  0.75
**  1.90
**    0.62  0.45 
2   -0.38
**  -0.05
*  0.08
**  -0.15    -0.45  -0.05  -0.10  -0.04    0.16  0.24 
3   -0.31
**  0.10
**  -0.17
**  0.02    -0.32
**  0.00  -0.13
**  0.14
**    0.22  0.32 
with children > 5 years old and husband > 40 years old       








**    0.62  0.44 
2   -0.23
**  0.00
**  -0.18  -0.08




**    0.14  0.20 
3   0.70  0.28
**  -0.27
**  1.35




**    0.24  0.36 
Note: 1. Leisure, 2. Domestic good, 3. Market good. 
 ** Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level; 
* at the 10%  level. 
 
 
Tab. 3.2   Compensated Price (ek) and Income Elasticities (e) by Gender and Family Type 
Traditional (One Earner ) Households 
  Husband    Wife    Shares 
  e1  e2   e3  e    e1  e2   e3  e    H  W 
       




**    -0.11  0.13
*  -0.02
*  1.58
**    0.64  0.47 
2   -0.11
**  0.08    0.03  -0.11
**    0.25  -0.56
**  0.31
**  -0.44
**    0.17  0.25 
3   0.15
**  0.03  -0.18




**    0.19  0.27 
without children       
1   0.00  0.00  -0.01  1.37
**    0.37
**  -0.35
**  -0.03  1.52
**    0.64  0.49 




**    0.17  0.23 
3   -0.51
**  0.02  0.18




**    0.19  0.28 
with children < 5 years old       
1   -0.00  -0.02
*   0.02  1.53
**    0.25  -0.19  -0.07
**  1.86
**    0.63  0.48 
2   -0.07
**   -0.02  0.06  -0.04    -0.31  -0.13  0.44
**  -0.25
**    0.20  0.28 
3    0.06  0.07  -0.13
**  0.17     0.08  0.54
**  -0.39
**  0.74
**    0.17  0.24 
with children > 5 years old and husband > 40 years old       
1   0.03
**  -0.02
**  -0.02  1.53
**    0.52
**   -0.46
**  -0.05
**  1.55
**    0.64  0.46 
2   -0.11
**  -0.01  0.12
**  -0.10
*    -0.99
**  0.51
**   0.48
**  -0.77
**    0.17  0.25 
3   -0.09
**  0.12




**    0.19  0.29 
Note: 1. Leisure, 2. Domestic good, 3. Market good.  
 ** Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level; 
* at the 10%  level. 
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Tab. 4  Intra-household allocation of resources by gender and family type  
 
  Non-traditional (Double Earner) Families  Traditional (One Earner) Families 
 





5 years old 
with children > 
5 years old and 
husband > 40 





5 years old 
with children > 
5 years old and 





Estimates of the Sharing Rule equation (7) 
 
T1 ( w1)  0.010
**  -0.006
**  0.014





  0.005  0.001  0.005  0.003  0.002  0.015  0.011  0.009 









  0.017  0.046  0.024  0.019  0.017  0.026  0.024  0.013 
K1 (y1)  0.001  0.013
**  0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.000     -0.000  0.000 
  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
K2 (y2)  0.003
**  -0.013
**  0.000  0.002
**  0.001
**   0.000   0.001
*  0.000 
  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001 
                 
Y 1/Y  58.8  59.3  58.9  60.6  59.2  55.9  58.9  59.6 
I1/Y  56.6  57.3  59.3  59.6  58.6  55.8  58.6  59.8 
Notes:    a) Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in italics;  
  b) 
** denotes statistically significant coefficients at the 5% significance level, 
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Figure 1. Intra-household allocation of resources: male share of household full income 
 





























Quintile  I  II  III  IV  V  Quintile  I  II  III  IV  V 
Y1/Y  58.8  57.5   58.5  58.5   60.2  I1/Y  53.3  54.4  56.1  57.4  60.3 






























Quintile  I  II  III  IV  V  Quintile  I  II  III  IV  V  
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Tab. 5      Contribution of Each Parent to the Cost of a Child 
 
 







Contribution by parents 
(percentage) 
(eq. 15) 
Father  Mother 
Child 0-2  1.23**  0.47  0.53 
Child 3-5  1.1**  0.4  0.6 
Child 6-17  1.07**  0.4  0.6 
 
 







Contribution by parents 
(percentage) 
(eq. 15) 
Father  Mother 
Child 0-2  1.21**  0.44  0.56 
Child 3-5  1.06**  0.44  0.56 
Child 6-17  1.09**  0.61  0.39 
 
 
Note: The equivalence scale is based on the consumption of the market good xm and the domestic product xz 
according to eq. (14). The figures are obtained multiplying the cost components reported in Table 4 for xm and 
xz weighted by the full income share reported at the bottom of Table 3 for the households without children. 
 
** Denotes statistically significant equivalence scales at the 5% significance level.   31 
Tab. 6     Decomposition of the Full Cost of a Child by Full Income Component,  
Gender and Family type 
 
 
a) Non-traditional (double earner) families 
  Father  Mother 
 
1
m M  
1
z M  
1
l M  
2
m M  
2
z M  
2
l M  
Child 0-2  1.06  1.13  0.84  1.08  1.2  0.79 
Child 0-5  1.01  1.06  0.93  1.06  1.08  0.88 
Child 6-17  1.01  1.04  0.95  1.05  1.05  0.92 
               
 
b) Traditional (one earner) families 
  Father  Mother 
 
1
m M  
1
z M  
1
l M  
2
m M  
2
z M  
2
l M  
Child 0-2  1.07  1.09  0.84  1.11  1.14  0.82 
Child 0-5  1.02  1.03  0.94  1.03  1.05  0.94 
Child 6-17  1.06  1.04  0.92  1.05  1.03  0.92 
     
Note: m denotes market goods, z domestic product, and l is leisure.   32 
Appendix.  
 




  Wage Equation for Women 
(Obs. 1290) 
Variables  Coeff.  Sig.    Variables  Coeff.  Sig. 
Constant  -5.177  *    Constant  0.504    
  0.538        0.47   
Household income   -0.001       Years of education  0.084  * 
  0.002        0.009   
Age  0.238  *    Age  0.03    
  0.028        0.019   
Age squared  -0.003  *    Age squared  -0.0001    
  0.001        0.00011   
Years of education  0.134  *    Work experience  0.064  * 
  0.007        0.019   
Number of children aged < 3  -0.343  *    South East  -0.103    
  0.088        0.057   
Number of children aged 3-5  -0.231  *    South West  -0.164  * 
  0.064        0.057   
Number of children aged 6-17  -0.183  *    Centre  -0.109  * 
  0.036        0.038   
Number of children aged 18-24  -0.157  *    Heckman's lambda  0.175    
  0.044        0.106   
Regional unemployment rate  -0.049  *         
  0.006      R
2  0.27   
Chronic disease  -0.27  *         
  0.087           
Partner not employed  0.156            
  0.106           
Notes:     a)  standard  errors  in  italic  are  heteroscedasticity-robust;  b)  *  denotes  statistically  significant 
coefficients at the 5% significance level. 
 
 Tab. A.2  Estimation of Gender Specific Demand Equations for Non-traditional (Double Earner) Households 
 
k D Ö  
02 _ Ö
nf k t   35 _ Ö
nf k t   614 _ Ö
nf k t   2 ^ _ Ö
nf k t   1 Ök Q   2 Ök Q   3 Ök Q  
k E Ö   1 Ö T   2 Ö T   1 Ö K   2 Ö K  
Husband    Sharing rule 










**  0.001  0.003
** 
  0.009  0.010  0.009  0.008  0.002  0.005  0.003  0.005  0.018  0.005  0.017  0.001  0.001 




**  0.000    0.191
**  -0.056
**  -0.229
**         
  0.004  0.005  0.004  0.004  0.001    0.005  0.005  0.008         
3. Market good  0.210
**  0.016
*  0.003  0.005  0.000      0.138
**   0.072
**         
  0.010  0.009  0.009  0.008  0.003      0.007  0.022         
Wife           








**         
  0.016  0.013  0.012  0.011  0.003  0.020  0.017  0.013  0.019         





*    0.106
**  -0.000  -0.303
**         
  0.008  0.006  0.006  0.005  0.002    0.025  0.015  0.013         
3. Market good  0.198
**  0.048
**  0.027  0.022
**  -0.001      0.155
**  0.009
**         
  0.015  0.011  0.010  0.008  0.002      0.013  0.023         
Notes:    a) Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in italics; b) 
** denotes statistically significant coefficients at the 5% significance level, 
* 10% level.  
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Tab. A.3  Estimation of gender specific demand equations for Traditional (One Earner) Households 
 
k D Ö  
02 _ Ö
nf k t   35 _ Ö
nf k t   614 _ Ö
nf k t   2 ^ _ Ö
nf k t   1 Ök Q   2 Ök Q   3 Ök Q  
k E Ö   1 Ö T   2 Ö T   1 Ö K   2 Ö K  
Husband    Sharing rule 










**  0.000  0.001
** 
  0.010  0.010  0.009  0.007  0.002  0.004  0.004  0.005  0.020  0.002  0.017  0.000  0.000 




**  0.000    0.177
**  -0.008  -0.195
**         
  0.004  0.003  0.002  0.002  0.000    0.011  0.008  0.007         
3. Market good  0.050
**  0.031
**  0.012  0.019
**  -0.003
*      0.123
**  -0.182
**         
  0.011  0.009  0.009  0.006  0.001      0.007  0.020         
Wife           








**         
  0.017  0.012  0.011  0.008  0.002  0.042  0.042  0.007  0.020         





*    0.163
**  -0.009  -0.363
**         
  0.008  0.004  0.003  0.002  0.001    0.050  0.017  0.009         
3. Market good  0.130
**  0.063
**  0.017  0.024
**  -0.001      0.125
**  0.077
**         
  0.018  0.010  0.011  0.008  0.002      0.011  0.021         
Notes:    a) Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in italics; b) 
** denotes statistically significant coefficients at the 5% significance level, 
* 10% level. 
 
 
  